Understanding Civil War Evidence And Analysis Pdf
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Ten papers combine large-N quantitative empirical analysis with comparative case studies to develop the theory of civil war.
- Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis, Volume 1. Africa
- Causes of the civil war activity pdf
- Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis, Volume 1. Africa
- The Civil War
Africa Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis No in World Bank Publications from The World Bank Abstract: The two volumes of Understanding Civil War build upon the World Bank's prior research on conflict and violence, particularly on the work of Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, whose model of civil war onset has sparked much discussion on the relationship between conflict and development in what came to be known as the "greed" versus "grievance" debate. The authors systematically apply the Collier-Hoeffler model to 15 countries in 6 different regions of the world, using a comparative case study methodology to revise and expand upon economic models of civil war. The book concludes that the "greed" versus "grievance" debate should be abandoned for a more complex model that considers greed and grievance as inextricably fused motives for civil war.
Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis, Volume 1. Africa
Cooperation, Conflict, and the Costs of Anarchy. International Organization forthcoming Civil War and the Current International System.
Daedalus Fall Self-Enforcing Democracy. American Economic Review : Papers and Proceedings , , Separatist Wars, Partition, and World Order. Neotrusteeship and the Problem of Weak States. Selection Effects and Deterrence. Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation. Journal of Conflict Resolution 41, 1 February , Explaining Interethnic Cooperation. Co-authored with David Laitin.
Rationalist Explanations for War. American Political Science Review 88 September , Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science. World Politics 43 January , Journal of Modern African Studies 26 March , I consider a model in which two states choose how much to arm and whether to attack in successive periods. Arms are useful not only for deterrence or taking territory, but also because they influence the resolution of a set of disputed issues.
Factors determining the tightness of the war constraint imply hypotheses about the international determinants of military effort and thus the costs of anarchy.
The model both synthesizes and revises a diverse range of theoretical arguments about the determinants of interstate cooperation and conflict. This essay sketches an explanation for the global spread of civil war up to the early s and the partial recession since then, arguing that some of the decline is likely due to policy responses by major powers working principally through the United Nations.
This is that for many civil-war torn or post-conflict countries, third parties do not know how to help locals build a self-governing, self-financing state within U. Social cooperation is critical to a wide variety of political and economic outcomes.
For this reason, international donors have embraced interventions designed to strengthen the ability of communities to solve collective-action problems, especially in post-conflict settings. We exploit the random assignment of a development program in Liberia to assess the effects of such interventions.
Using a matching funds experiment we find evidence that these interventions can alter cooperation capacity. However, we observe effects only in communities in which, by design, both men and women faced the collective action challenge. These gains did not operate in areas where only women took part in the matching funds experiment, possibly because they could rely on traditional institutions unaffected by the external intervention. The combined evidence suggests that the impact of donor interventions designed to enhance cooperation can depend critically on the kinds of social dilemmas that communities face, and the flexibility they have in determining who should solve them.
Minor changes in the sample framing and the recovery of missing data undermine it. Should ethnonationalist wars be resolved by formally partitioning states?
The Wilsonian diagnosis is wrong. Five factors are shown to be strongly related to civil war duration. Civil wars emerging from coups or revolutions tend to be short.
Civil wars in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union have also tended to be relatively brief, as have anti-colonial wars. So are conflicts in which a rebel group derives major funding from contraband such as opium, diamonds, or coca. The article seeks to explain these regularities, developing a game model focused on the puzzle of what prevents negotiated settlements to long-running, destructive civil wars for which conflicting military expectations are an implausible explanation.
For their empirical evaluation, several active research programs in economics and political science require data on ethnic groups across countries. After addressing conceptual and practical obstacles, I present a list of ethnic groups in countries that made up at least 1 percent of the country population in the early s.
I compare a measure of ethnic fractionalization based on this list with the most commonly used measure. I also construct an index of cultural fractionalization that uses the structural distance between languages as a proxy for the cultural distance between groups in a country.
An influential conventional wisdom holds that civil wars proliferated rapidly with the end of the Cold War and that the root cause of many or most of these has been ethnic nationalism. We show that the current prevalence of internal war is mainly the result of a steady accumulation of protracted conflicts since the 50s and 60s rather than a sudden change associated with a new, post-Cold War international system.
We examine the theoretical implications of the observation that ethnic identities are socially constructed for explaining ethnic violence, distinguishing between two classes of mechanisms.
If individuals are viewed as the agents who construct identities, then constructivist explanations for ethnic violence tend to merge with analyses that stress strategic action by both elites and mass publics.
In contrast, if discursive formations are the agents that construct ethnic identities, then constructivist explanations tend to merge with accounts that stress internal logics of specific cultures. The most common narrative in these texts has largescale ethnic violence provoked by elites, often motivated by intra-ethnic conflicts.
Neoliberals and their neorealist critics have debated the relative importance of two main obstacles to international cooperation—problems of cheating and enforcement and problems of relative gains. By contrast, I argue that problems of international cooperation have a common strategic structure in which a third, distinct obstacle plays a crucial role. Furthermore, the bargaining and enforcement problems interact.
A high expectation of continued interactions may make enforcing the agreement easier, but it can also give states an incentive to bargain harder, delaying agreement in hopes of getting a better deal. Empirical evidence from trade and arms control negotiations suggests that this mechanism may help to explain the costly standoffs that are often observed in international politics and are problematic for received neoliberal theories.
The author distinguishes between two types of costly signals that state leaders might employ in trying to credibly communicate their foreign policy interests to other states, whether in the realm of grand strategy or crisis diplomacy.
Analysis of a game model depicting the essentials of each case yields two principal results. They also generate empirical puzzles, such as why the seemingly plausible logic of inference that undermines bluffing in the model does not operate in all empirical cases. Though both journalists and the academic literature on ethnic conflict give the opposite impression, a peaceful and even cooperative relations between ethnic groups are far more common than is large-scale violence.
Using a social matching game model, we show that local-level interethnic cooperation can be supported in essentially two ways. A range of examples suggests that both equilibria occur empirically and have properties expected from the theoretical analysis. Realist and other scholars commonly hold that rationally led states can and sometimes do fight when no peaceful bargains exist that both would prefer to war.
Against this view, I show that under very broad conditions there will exist negotiated settlements that genuinely rational states would mutually prefer to a risky and costly fight. Popular rationalist and realist explanations for war fail either to address or to explain adequately what would prevent leaders from locating a less costly bargain.
Essentially just two mechanisms can resolve this puzzle on strictly rationalist terms. The first turns on the fact that states have both private information about capabilities and resolve and the incentive to misrepresent it. The second turns on the fact that in specific strategic contexts states may be unable credibly to commit to uphold a mutually preferable bargain.
Historical examples suggest that both mechanisms are empirically plausible. A leader who backs down suffers 1 audience costs that increase as the public confrontation proceeds.
The model also generates strong comparative statics results, mainly on the question of which side is most likely to back down. Publicly observable measures of relative military capabilities and relative interests prove to have no direct effect once a crisis begins. Instead, relative audience costs matter: the side with a stronger domestic audience e. More broadly, the analysis suggests that democracies should be able to signal their intentions to other states more credibly and clearly than authoritarian states can, perhaps ameliorating the security dilemma between democratic states.
Analysis of a game-theoretic model of crisis signaling substantially refines and revises this claim. The methodological status and the viability of this very common procedure are unclear and are worth examining. Are counterfactual thought experiments a viable means of assessing hypotheses about national and international outcomes, or are they methodologically invalid in principle? The paper addresses the first question in some detail and begins discussion of the second.
Examples from work on the causes of World War I, the nonoccurrence of World War III, social revolutions, the breakdown of democratic regimes in Latin America, and the origins of fascism and corporatism in Europe illustrate the use, problems and potential of counterfactual argument in small-N-oriented political science research.
Causes of the civil war activity pdf
The system can't perform the operation now. Try again later. Citations per year. Duplicate citations. The following articles are merged in Scholar. Their combined citations are counted only for the first article. Merged citations.
Filipe R. Gianmarco Leon, Camilo Rey Sabogal, Helge Holtermann, Robinson, Discussion Papers. Ali Abdel Gadir Ali,
Cooperation, Conflict, and the Costs of Anarchy. International Organization forthcoming Civil War and the Current International System. Daedalus Fall Self-Enforcing Democracy. American Economic Review : Papers and Proceedings , ,
Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis, Volume 1. Africa
While there were many reasons that led to the Civil War, the underlying reason was the fact that the northern states wanted to outlaw slavery. Civil war has gradually become the most widespread, the most destructive, and now the most characteristic form of organised human The English Civil War - An ever-expanding library of free worksheets, interactive resources, activities, games and lessons all geared toward the KS3 History curriculum. Causes of the Civil War Chart Chpt. A great way to interactively teach your students about the conflict between the average Americans who fought in the Civil War!
The Civil War
The English Civil Wars are traditionally considered to have begun in England in August , when Charles I raised an army against the wishes of Parliament , ostensibly to deal with a rebellion in Ireland. Throughout the s, war between king and Parliament ravaged England, but it also struck all of the kingdoms held by the house of Stuart —and, in addition to war between the various British and Irish dominions, there was civil war within each of the Stuart states. The wars finally ended in with the flight of Charles II to France and, with him, the hopes of the British monarchy. This inclusion of inland towns was construed as a new tax without parliamentary authorization. Nevertheless, despite grumblings, there is little doubt that had Charles managed to rule his other dominions as he controlled England, his peaceful reign might have been extended indefinitely. Scotland and Ireland proved his undoing.
Лужа крови под телом Хейла расползалась на ковре, напоминая пятно разлитой нефти. Стратмор смущенно посмотрел на труп, затем перевел взгляд на Сьюзан. Неужели она узнала. Этого не может. Стратмор был уверен, что предусмотрел. - Сьюзан, - сказал он, подходя ближе.
Дэвид. Паника заставила Сьюзан действовать. У нее резко запершило в горле, и в поисках выхода она бросилась к двери. Переступив порог, она вовремя успела ухватиться за дверную раму и лишь благодаря этому удержалась на ногах: лестница исчезла, превратившись в искореженный раскаленный металл. Сьюзан в ужасе оглядела шифровалку, превратившуюся в море огня.
Джабба, - спросил Фонтейн, - много они похитили. - Совсем мало, - сказал Джабба, посмотрев на монитор. - Всего лишь какие-то обрывки, в полном виде -. Фонтейн медленно кивнул и улыбнулся одними уголками губ. Он искал глазами Сьюзан Флетчер, но она уже стояла прямо перед экраном, на котором крупным планом было видно лицо Дэвида Беккера.
Халохот оценил расстояние до входа. Семь ступеней. Он мысленно прорепетировал предстоящее убийство. Если у входа на площадку взять вправо, можно увидеть самый дальний левый угол площадки, даже еще не выйдя на. Если Беккер окажется там, Халохот сразу же выстрелит. Если нет, он войдет и будет двигаться на восток, держа в поле зрения правый угол, единственное место, где мог находиться Беккер. Он улыбнулся.
Лицо Стратмора из багрового стало пунцовым. Сомнений в том, кого именно обвиняет Чатрукьян, не. Единственный терминал в шифровалке, с которого разрешалось обходить фильтры Сквозь строй, принадлежал Стратмору. Когда коммандер заговорил, в его голосе звучали ледяные нотки: - Мистер Чатрукьян, я не хочу сказать, что вас это не касается, но фильтры обошел .
Внезапно откуда-то появился пожилой человек, подбежал к Танкадо и опустился возле него на колени. Халохот замедлил шаги. Мгновение спустя появились еще двое - тучный мужчина и рыжеволосая женщина. Они также подошли к Танкадо.
Чатрукьяну была известна история ее создания. Несмотря на все предпринятые в конце 1970-х годов усилия министерства обороны сохранить Интернет для себя, этот инструмент оказался настолько соблазнительным, что не мог не привлечь к себе внимания всего общества. Со временем им заинтересовались университеты, а вскоре после этого появились и коммерческие серверы. Шлюзы открылись - в Интернет хлынула публика. К началу 1990-х годов некогда тщательно охраняемый правительством Интернет превратился в перенаселенное пространство, заполненное общедоступными почтовыми серверами и порнографическими сайтами.