Geopolitics And International Relations Pdf
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- Is COVID-19 a Geopolitical Game-Changer?
- The ‘Nature’ of International Relations: From Geopolitics to the Anthropocene
- The ‘Nature’ of International Relations: From Geopolitics to the Anthropocene
- Geopolitics and International Relations of Resources
Powered by WP Bannerize. Our focus this week brings you some of the important lectures and debates held at the IWM on this new world dis order in recent years, which could function as an intellectual compass for the new world of geopolitical imaginations and claims, their possibilities and limitations. His three talks are among the most viewed videos on our YouTube channel.
Is COVID-19 a Geopolitical Game-Changer?
At the level of international relations, geopolitics is a method of studying foreign policy to understand, explain and predict international political behavior through geographical variables. These include area studies , climate , topography , demography , natural resources , and applied science of the region being evaluated.
Geopolitics focuses on political power linked to geographic space. In particular, territorial waters and land territory in correlation with diplomatic history.
Topics of geopolitics include relations between the interests of international political actors focused within an area, a space, or a geographical element, relations which create a geopolitical system. According to Christopher Gogwilt and other researchers, the term is currently being used to describe a broad spectrum of concepts, in a general sense used as "a synonym for international political relations", but more specifically "to imply the global structure of such relations"; this usage builds on an "early-twentieth-century term for a pseudoscience of political geography " and other pseudoscientific theories of historical and geographic determinism.
Alfred Thayer Mahan — was a frequent commentator on world naval strategic and diplomatic affairs. Mahan believed that national greatness was inextricably associated with the sea—and particularly with its commercial use in peace and its control in war.
Mahan's theoretical framework came from Antoine-Henri Jomini , and emphasized that strategic locations such as choke points , canals, and coaling stations , as well as quantifiable levels of fighting power in a fleet, were conducive to control over the sea. He proposed six conditions required for a nation to have sea power :.
Mahan regarded those countries, located between Britain and Russia, as if between "Scylla and Charybdis". Of the two monsters — Britain and Russia — it was the latter that Mahan considered more threatening to the fate of Central Asia.
Mahan was impressed by Russia's transcontinental size and strategically favorable position for southward expansion. Therefore, he found it necessary for the Anglo-Saxon "sea power" to resist Russia. Homer Lea , in The Day of the Saxon , asserted that the entire Anglo-Saxon race faced a threat from German Teuton , Russian Slav , and Japanese expansionism: The "fatal" relationship of Russia, Japan, and Germany "has now assumed through the urgency of natural forces a coalition directed against the survival of Saxon supremacy.
He thought the Anglo-Saxons faced certain disaster from their militant opponents. Two famous security advisors from the cold war period, Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski , argued to continue the United States geopolitical focus on Eurasia and, particularly on Russia, despite the dissolution of the USSR and the end of the Cold War. Both continued their influence on geopolitics after the end of the Cold War,  writing books on the subject in the s— Diplomacy and The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives.
Kissinger argued against the belief that with the dissolution of the USSR, hostile intentions had come to an end and traditional foreign policy considerations no longer applied.
After Russia, the second geopolitical threat which remained was Germany and, as Mackinder had feared ninety years ago, its partnership with Russia. During the Cold War, Kissinger argues, both sides of the Atlantic recognized that, "unless America is organically involved in Europe, it would later be obliged to involve itself under circumstances which would be far less favorable to both sides of the Atlantic. That is even more true today. Germany has become so strong that existing European institutions cannot strike a balance between Germany and its European partners all by themselves.
Nor can Europe, even with the assistance of Germany, manage […] Russia" all by itself. Thus Kissinger believed that no country's interests would ever be served if Germany and Russia were to ever form a partnership in which each country would consider itself the principal partner. They would raise fears of condominium. Spykman's vision of Eurasia was strongly confirmed: "Geopolitically, America is an island off the shores of the large landmass of Eurasia, whose resources and population far exceed those of the United States.
The domination by a single power of either of Eurasia's two principal spheres—Europe and Asia—remains a good definition of strategic danger for America. Cold War or no Cold War. For such a grouping would have the capacity to outstrip America economically and, in the end, militarily.
That danger would have to be resisted even if the dominant power was apparently benevolent, for if its intentions ever changed, America would find itself with a grossly diminished capacity for effective resistance and a growing inability to shape events. Having converted from an ideologist into a geopolitician, Kissinger retrospectively interpreted the Cold War in geopolitical terms—an approach which was not characteristic of his works during the Cold War.
Now, however, he focused on the beginning of the Cold War: "The objective of moral opposition to Communism had merged with the geopolitical task of containing Soviet expansion.
The Grand Chessboard described the American triumph in the Cold War in terms of control over Eurasia: for the first time ever, a "non-Eurasian" power had emerged as a key arbiter of "Eurasian" power relations. In classical Spykman terms, Brzezinski formulated his geostrategic "chessboard" doctrine of Eurasia, which aims to prevent the unification of this mega-continent. It follows that… American foreign policy must…employ its influence in Eurasia in a manner that creates a stable continental equilibrium, with the United States as the political arbiter.
But in the meantime it is imperative that no Eurasian challenger emerges, capable of dominating Eurasia and thus also of challenging America… For America the chief geopolitical prize is Eurasia…and America's global primacy is directly dependent on how long and how effectively its preponderance on the Eurasian continent is sustained. The Austro-Hungarian historian Emil Reich — is considered to be the first having coined the term in English   as early as and later published in England in in his book Foundations of Modern Europe.
Sir Halford Mackinder 's Heartland Theory initially received little attention outside the world of geography, but some thinkers would claim that it subsequently influenced the foreign policies of world powers. Mackinder's doctrine of geopolitics involved concepts diametrically opposed to the notion of Alfred Thayer Mahan about the significance of navies he coined the term sea power in world conflict. He saw navy as a basis of Colombian era empire roughly from to the 19th century , and predicted the 20th century to be domain of land power.
The Heartland theory hypothesized a huge empire being brought into existence in the Heartland—which wouldn't need to use coastal or transoceanic transport to remain coherent. The basic notions of Mackinder's doctrine involve considering the geography of the Earth as being divided into two sections: the World Island or Core, comprising Eurasia and Africa ; and the Peripheral "islands", including the Americas , Australia , Japan , the British Isles , and Oceania.
Not only was the Periphery noticeably smaller than the World Island, it necessarily required much sea transport to function at the technological level of the World Island—which contained sufficient natural resources for a developed economy. Mackinder posited that the industrial centers of the Periphery were necessarily located in widely separated locations. The World Island could send its navy to destroy each one of them in turn, and could locate its own industries in a region further inland than the Periphery so they would have a longer struggle reaching them, and would face a well-stocked industrial bastion.
Mackinder called this region the Heartland. Mackinder's notion of geopolitics was summed up when he said:. Who rules Central and Eastern Europe commands the Heartland. Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island.
Who rules the World-Island commands the World. Nicholas J. Spykman was both a follower and critic of geostrategists Alfred Mahan, and Halford Mackinder. His work was based on assumptions similar to Mackinder's,  including the unity of world politics and the world sea. He extends this to include the unity of the air. Spykman adopts Mackinder's divisions of the world, renaming some:. Under Spykman's theory, a Rimland separates the Heartland from ports that are usable throughout the year that is, not frozen up during winter.
Spykman suggested this required that attempts by Heartland nations particularly Russia to conquer ports in the Rimland must be prevented. Spykman modified Mackinder's formula on the relationship between the Heartland and the Rimland or the inner crescent , claiming that "Who controls the rimland rules Eurasia. Who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world. Another famous follower of Mackinder was Karl Haushofer who called Mackinder's Geographical Pivot of History a "genius' scientific tractate.
Following Mackinder he suggested an alliance with the Soviet Union and, advancing a step beyond Mackinder, added Japan to his design of the Eurasian Bloc. In , at the centenary of The Geographical Pivot of History, famous Historian Paul Kennedy wrote: "Right now with hundreds of thousands of US troops in the Eurasian rimlands and with administration constantly explaining why it has to stay the course, it looks as if Washington is taking seriously Mackinder's injunction to ensure control of the geographical pivot of history.
Friedrich Ratzel — , influenced by thinkers such as Darwin and zoologist Ernst Heinrich Haeckel , contributed to 'Geopolitik' by the expansion on the biological conception of geography, without a static conception of borders.
Positing that states are organic and growing, with borders representing only a temporary stop in their movement, he held that the expanse of a state's borders is a reflection of the health of the nation—meaning that static countries are in decline. Ratzel published several papers, among which was the essay "Lebensraum" concerning biogeography.
Ratzel created a foundation for the German variant of geopolitics, geopolitik. Influenced by the American geostrategist Alfred Thayer Mahan, Ratzel wrote of aspirations for German naval reach, agreeing that sea power was self-sustaining, as the profit from trade would pay for the merchant marine, unlike land power.
The geopolitical theory of Ratzel has been criticized as being too sweeping, and his interpretation of human history and geography being too simple and mechanistic. Critically, he also underestimated the importance of social organization in the development of power. The key concepts of Haushofer's Geopolitik were Lebensraum, autarky , pan-regions , and organic borders.
States have, Haushofer argued, an undeniable right to seek natural borders which would guarantee autarky. Haushofer's influence within the Nazi Party has been challenged, given that Haushofer failed to incorporate the Nazis' racial ideology into his work. Bassin reveals that these popular views are in important ways misleading and incorrect. Despite the numerous similarities and affinities between the two doctrines, geopolitics was always held suspect by the National Socialist ideologists.
This was understandable, for the underlying philosophical orientation of geopolitics did not comply with that of National Socialism. Geopolitics shared Ratzel's scientific materialism and geographic determinism, and held that human society was determined by external influences—in the face of which qualities held innately by individuals or groups were of reduced or no significance.
National Socialism rejected in principle both materialism and determinism and also elevated innate human qualities, in the form of a hypothesized 'racial character,' to the factor of greatest significance in the constitution of human society. These differences led after to friction and ultimately to open denunciation of geopolitics by Nazi ideologues.
The resultant negative association, particularly in U. This has been observed in particular by critics of contemporary academic geography, and proponents of a "neo"-classical geopolitics in particular. These include Haverluk et al. Negative associations with the term "geopolitics" and its practical application stemming from its association with World War II and pre-World War II German scholars and students of Geopolitics are largely specific to the field of academic Geography, and especially sub-disciplines of human geography such as political geography.
However, this negative association is not as strong in disciplines such as history or political science, which make use of geopolitical concepts. Classical Geopolitics forms an important element of analysis for military history as well as for sub-disciplines of political science such as international relations and security studies. This difference in disciplinary perspectives is addressed by Bert Chapman in Geopolitics: A Guide To the Issues , in which Chapman makes note that academic and professional International Relations journals are more amenable to the study and analysis of Geopolitics, and in particular Classical Geopolitics, than contemporary academic journals in the field of political geography.
In disciplines outside Geography, Geopolitics is not negatively viewed as it often is among academic geographers such as Carolyn Gallaher or Klaus Dodds as a tool of imperialism or associated with Nazism, but rather viewed as a valid and consistent manner of assessing major international geopolitical circumstances and events, not necessarily related to armed conflict or military operations.
French geopolitical doctrines broadly opposed to German Geopolitik and reject the idea of a fixed geography. French geography is focused on the evolution of polymorphic territories being the result of mankind's actions. It also relies on the consideration of long time periods through a refusal to take specific events into account.
This method has been theorized by Professor Lacoste according to three principles: Representation ; Diachronie ; and Diatopie. In The Spirit of the Laws , Montesquieu outlined the view that man and societies are influenced by climate. He believed that hotter climates create hot-tempered people and colder climates aloof people, whereas the mild climate of France is ideal for political systems.
Alike Ratzel, he considers geography through a global vision. However, in complete opposition to Ratzel's vision, Reclus considers geography not to be unchanging; it is supposed to evolve commensurately to the development of human society. His marginal political views resulted in his rejection by academia. Like Reclus, Ancel rejects German determinist views on geopolitics including Haushofer's doctrines.
This method was inspired by the French geographer Paul Vidal de la Blache who in turn was influenced by German thought, particularly that of Friedrich Ratzel whom he had met in Germany.
Braudel's method was to analyse the interdependence between individuals and their environment.
The ‘Nature’ of International Relations: From Geopolitics to the Anthropocene
One aim of post-humanist work is to find a way of including the natural world in a meaningful way into IR theory and analysis see Kaltofen this volume. This is a challenge, but perhaps not an insurmountable one. After all, the discipline has roots in geopolitical analysis of how geography and climates affect world politics. The chapter concludes by considering how best to proceed in developing an IR as if the Earth matters. IR has some of its deepest disciplinary roots in considerations about geography.
He was a teacher of geopolitics, and FPRI has reflected his viewpoint since its creation. It could seem strange, therefore, for us to publish the article by Chris Fettweis, which constitutes a frontal assault on the very utility of geopolitics. For instance, he writes that geopolitics. While it is not at all clear that classical geopolitics has ever contained any insights of much importance to scholarship or strategy, there can be no doubt that it has nothing to say to twenty-first century international politics. Geopolitics has always been descriptively absurd and pre-scriptively pathological, attributes that have been only magnified during the current intellectual resurrection. It should be noted that all theories in the various social sciences, including international relations, are and will remain—despite the aspirations and best efforts of Mr.
The ‘Nature’ of International Relations: From Geopolitics to the Anthropocene
Geopolitics , analysis of the geographic influences on power relationships in international relations. In contemporary discourse, geopolitics has been widely employed as a loose synonym for international politics. Arguments about the political effects of geography —particularly climate , topography , arable land, and access to the sea—have appeared in Western political thought since at least the ancient Greek era and were prominent in the writings of philosophers as diverse as Aristotle — bc and Montesquieu — The best-known body of geopolitical writings is the extensive literature of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, much of which focused on the impact on world politics of the new technologies of the Industrial Revolution.
The huge Covid storm is undoubtedly only still in its infancy. It has not yet really reached the Global South, for example, or the innumerable pockets of abject misery on the planet in Bangladesh, Yemen, South Sudan, refugee camps in Pakistan or India, Idlib, and so on. The full economic, cyclical and structural effects are not quite visible yet, but, in any case, they will be gigantic. It would therefore be risky to put forward at this time a general theory of the geopolitics of the pandemic.
Geopolitics and International Relations of Resources
- Они не преступницы - глупо было бы искать их, как обычных жуликов. Беккер все еще не мог прийти в себя от всего, что услышал. - Может, там был кто-нибудь. - Нет. Только мы трое.
Ей хотелось убежать, но сильные руки тянули ее. - Я люблю тебя, - шептал коммандер. - Я любил тебя. У нее свело желудок.
Unique Course and Structure
Сьюзан поднялась на верхнюю ступеньку лестницы. Она не успела постучать, как заверещал электронный дверной замок. Дверь открылась, и коммандер помахал ей рукой. - Спасибо, что пришла, Сьюзан. Я тебе очень благодарен. - Не стоит благодарности. - Она улыбнулась и села напротив шефа.
У него будет пистолет… От этой мысли у Стратмора свело желудок. Кто знает, что произойдет, прежде чем он решит освободить Сьюзан… если он ее вообще освободит. Я обязан позвонить в службу безопасности, - решил .
Вы думаете, он, умирая, до последний секунды переживал за несчастное АНБ. - Распадается туннельный блок! - послышался возглас одного из техников. - Полная незащищенность наступит максимум через пятнадцать минут. - Вот что я вам скажу, - решительно заявил директор. - Через пятнадцать минут все страны третьего мира на нашей планете будут знать, как построить межконтинентальную баллистическую ракету.
Но нам известно, где. - И вы не хотите ничего предпринять. - Нет. Он подстраховался - передал копию ключа анонимной третьей стороне на тот случай… ну, если с ним что-нибудь случится.
Я не сказал ему про спутницу. - Взмахом руки Клушар величественно отверг вопрос Беккера. - Они не преступницы - глупо было бы искать их, как обычных жуликов.